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constitutes illegal coercion, for courts see pickets as having a unique power to induce automatic action. On the
other end, the Supreme Court has declared that handing out fliers, a tactic commonly referred to as
“handbilling,” is not coercive and is, therefore, legal. There is no easy way to judge the legality of secondary
protest activity that falls between these two extremes, because courts and the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) have consistently failed to articulate the key elements of coercion. Instead, they judge the legality of
union secondary protests on a caseby- case basis, typically by seeing if the protest activity can be analogized to
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INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2004, seven individuals affiliated with Local 15 of the
Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association (“Sheet Metal
Workers”) staged a mock funeral procession outside of a hospital in
1
Brandon, Florida. Four of the individuals served as pallbearers,
2
carrying a sheet metal coffin.
They were followed by another
individual, dressed as the Grim Reaper, complete with an eight-foot3
tall black costume and plastic scythe. As the “mourners” walked a
loop of several hundred feet in front of the hospital, a radio blasted
4
classical funeral marches. The remaining two union officials handed
out leaflets warning, “Going to Brandon Regional Hospital should
not be a Grave Decision,” and summarizing lawsuits brought against
5
the hospital for wrongful deaths and improper treatment.
Through this “street theater,” the union was not protesting the
quality of the hospital’s medical care or even the hospital’s treatment
6
of its own workers. Rather, the union disapproved of the labor
practices of two subcontractors whom the hospital had hired to
7
perform construction and staffing work. The union hoped that by
putting pressure on the hospital it could force the hospital to stop
8
doing business with the subcontractors. This type of protest is
commonly referred to as a “secondary boycott” or “secondary
9
protest.” It is “secondary” because it is not directed at the real target
1. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers ALJ), 2004
NLRB LEXIS 688, at *17-21 (Dec. 7, 2004), aff’d, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 2006 NLRB
LEXIS 3, at *5-8 (Jan. 9, 2006).
2. Id. at *18.
3. Id.
4. Id. at *18-19.
5. Id. at *20.
6. Kentov ex rel. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d
1259, 1263, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005).
7. See id. at 1261 (establishing that the union’s true grievance was with the use of
non-union labor by a sheet metal fabrication and installation contractor and a
temporary staffing agency).
8. Id. at 1263.
9. See David Westfall & Gregor Thüsing, Strikes and Lockouts in Germany and Under
Federal Legislation in the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 29, 50-51 (1999) (defining a “secondary boycott” as when a union “strikes or
pickets Employer F to put pressure on it to stop doing business with Employer E”);
see also Matthew W. Finkin, Employer Neutrality as Hot Cargo: Thoughts on the Making of
Labor Policy, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 547-48 & n.20 (2006)
(noting that the statutory prohibition of secondary boycotts does not preclude a
secondary employer from voluntarily boycotting another employer). The NLRA’s
secondary boycott ban does not forbid secondary employers from boycotting the
businesses of primary employers, but rather forbids unions from trying to force
secondary employers to engage in such boycotts. Finkin, supra, at 547-48 & n.20. As
a matter of terminology, this Comment will distinguish between “secondary boycotts”
and “secondary consumer boycotts,” which refer to consumer boycotts of secondary
employers’ businesses.
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of the union’s criticism, but at employers who do business with the
10
real target.
This Comment discusses whether the government may prohibit
unions from engaging in types of secondary protest like mock
11
12
funerals.
Since 1959, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor
13
Relations Act (“NLRA” or “the Act”) has made it illegal for unions to
“threaten, coerce, or restrain” secondary employers into severing
14
their business ties with primary employers. Precisely what forms of
15
protest this provision outlaws, however, is unclear. On one end of
16
the spectrum, courts almost always find that picketing secondary
employers constitutes illegal coercion, for courts see pickets as having
17
a unique power to induce automatic action. On the other end, the
Supreme Court has declared that handing out fliers, a tactic
commonly referred to as “handbilling,” is not coercive and is,

10. Finkin, supra note 9, at 547-48. See generally 8 THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW
§ 36.01[1] (LexisNexis 2002) (1964) (explaining that the fundamental difference
between a primary protest and a secondary protest is the target of the protest);
Archibald Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44
MINN. L. REV. 257, 271 (1959) (defining “secondary activity” as a refusal to deal with
an entity that transacts with the offending employer).
11. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that unions have both a legal and a
constitutional right to protest secondary employers with mock funerals, rat balloons,
and giant banners that declare “Shame!” on the secondary employer).
12. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000).
13. Id. §§ 151-160.
14. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).
15. See NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274,
290 (1960) (observing that the words of the provision are “nonspecific, indeed
vague”); see also Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959 (pt. 2), 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1113 (1960) (describing § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as
“surely one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal labor
statute”). See generally Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB
Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 905, 931-62 (2005) (providing a thorough overview of the many different
meanings that have been given to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)); Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen
of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1366-1430 (1962) (discussing the
different standards for discerning between a protest directed at a secondary
employer and one directed at a primary employer).
16. The precise definition of picketing is the subject of some debate. See infra
notes 86-90 and accompanying text. Generally speaking, however, the term
“picketing” refers to the posting of individuals by a labor union “at the approach to a
place of business to accomplish a purpose which advances the causes of the union.”
Bock, supra note 15, at 921.
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S.
607, 616 (1980) (finding that a picket that called for a total consumer boycott of a
secondary employer’s store was illegal); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 461,
469 (1950) (upholding the state of California’s right to prohibit picketing intended
to force a grocery store to hire only black employees until the proportion of black
employees in the store reflected the proportion of black members of the local
community).
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18

therefore, legal.
There is no easy way to judge the legality of
secondary protest activity that falls between these two extremes,
19
because courts and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
have consistently failed to articulate the key elements of coercion.
Instead, they judge the legality of union secondary protests on a caseby-case basis, typically by seeing if the protest activity can be
20
analogized to picketing.
This approach, which this Comment refers to as the “picketing
test,” fails to give unions a clear idea of what types of secondary
21
protest will be analogized to picketing and thus prohibited.
Moreover, this approach allows for the prohibition of some
constitutionally protected speech, because picketing and other forms
of protest resembling picketing are not inherently devoid of First
22
Amendment guarantees. The consequences are illustrated by the
23
government’s recent efforts to punish unions for protesting
24
25
secondary employers with mock funerals, giant rat balloons, and

18. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bld. & Constr. Trades
Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988) (holding that the distribution of
leaflets by a union against a secondary employer does not constitute an “unfair
practice” under § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
19. The NLRB is the executive agency responsible for enforcing the NLRA.
20. See infra Part I (describing how, rather than defining “coercion,” courts
usually list examples of coercive behavior and analyze the legality of any challenged
union secondary protest by seeing if it can be matched up with any of those
examples).
21. See infra Part II.A (explaining that there is no consensus over what constitutes
picketing, and that some judges feel the mere presence of a group of workers in
front of a place of business constitutes picketing, while other judges require
additional elements such as the holding of signs, marching back and forth
(“patrolling”), or a confrontational character).
22. See infra Part II.B (arguing that picketing is expression, and therefore the
government may only burden picketing with restrictions that are narrowly tailored to
serve an important government interest).
23. The General Counsel of the NLRB is responsible for investigating allegations
of illegal union or employer activity. NLRB, About the NLRB, How Are Unfair Labor
Practice Cases Processed?, http://www.nlrb.gov/about_us/overview/fact_sheet.aspx
(last visited June 1, 2007). After a party has lodged a complaint with one of the
NLRB’s local field offices, that office investigates the claim. Id. If the Regional
Director of the office deems the claim sufficient, the director will first try to get the
parties to settle their dispute. Id. If the settlement fails, the Regional Director will
issue a formal complaint, which will place the action before an NLRB Administrative
Law Judge. Id. If that decision is appealed, it will be considered by the five-member
NLRB in Washington, D.C. Id. The NLRB’s decisions are subject to appeal in any of
the United States Courts of Appeals. Id. See generally Timothy F. Ryan & Kathryn M.
Davis, Banners, Rats, and Other Inflatable Toys: Do They Constitute Picket Activity? Do They
Violate Section 8(b)(4)?, 20 LAB. LAW. 137, 144-47 (2004) (reviewing the history of the
General Counsel’s stance on the legality of secondary boycotts using rat balloons and
banners and noting that the General Counsel has, in the last decade, begun to
aggressively investigate unions’ secondary use of rat balloons and banners).
24. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (describing the mock funeral
staged by the Sheet Metal Workers outside the hospital in Brandon, Florida).
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large banners that declare “SHAME ON [NAME OF SECONDARY
26
EMPLOYER]!” and “LABOR DISPUTE!” Though these efforts have
not had great success, at least one administrative law judge has found
27
each of these three forms of union secondary protest illegal, despite
28
the fact that all three are likely constitutionally protected.
25. See Sheet Metal Workers ALJ, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *13 (Dec. 7, 2004)
(observing how, in addition to the mock funeral, the Sheet Metal Workers at other
times inflated a twelve-foot-wide, sixteen-foot-tall balloon in the shape of a rat one
hundred feet from the hospital entrance), aff’d, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n
Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers NLRB), 346 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3, at *7
n.3 (Jan. 9, 2006) (avoiding a ruling on the legality of the rat balloon because the
Board had already found that the union committed an unfair labor practice through
its staging of the mock funeral); Laborers’ E. Region Organizing Fund, 346 N.L.R.B.
No. 105, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 167, at *4-8 (Apr. 28, 2006) (explaining that the union
inflated a thirty-foot rat wearing a sign with the name of the primary employer with
whom the union had a dispute at the entrance to a secondary employer’s
construction site).
26. E.g., Mid-Atl. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, No. 5-CC-1289, 2006 NLRB LEXIS
80, at *3-5 (Mar. 2, 2006); Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Richie’s Installations), No.
21-CC-3337, 2005 WL 2071662 (NLRB Aug. 22, 2005); Sw. Reg’l Council of
Carpenters (Held Props. II), No. 31-CC-2126, 2005 WL 831458 (NLRB Apr. 5, 2005);
United Bhd. of Carpenters Locals 184 & 1498 (Grayhawk Dev.), No. 28-CC-973, 2005
WL 195115 (NLRB Jan. 13, 2005); United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1506 (Sunstone
Hotel Investors), No. 31-CC-2121, 2005 WL 77044 (NLRB Jan. 6, 2005); Sw. Reg’l
Council of Carpenters (New Star Gen. Contractors), No. 27-CC-877, 2004 WL 2671638
(NLRB Nov. 12, 2004); Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Held Props. I), No. 31-CC2115, 2004 WL 762435 (NLRB Apr. 2, 2004); Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters
(Carignan Constr. Co.), No. 31-CC-2113, 2004 WL 359075 (NLRB Feb. 18, 2004);
United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1827 (United Parcel Serv., Inc.), No. 28-CC-933, 2003
WL 21206515 (NLRB May 9, 2003). This Comment will refer to this practice as
“bannering.”
27. The NLRB already has declared that the Sheet Metal Workers’ mock funeral
violated the secondary boycott ban because it involved members “patrolling” back
and forth in front of the hospital and, therefore, constituted picketing. Sheet Metal
Workers NLRB, 346 N.L.R.B. 22 (2006) NLRB LEXIS 3, at *5-8. However, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently reversed this
decision, holding that a union’s secondary mock funeral is constitutionally protected
speech. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15 v. NLRB (Sheet Metal Workers D.C.
Circuit), No. 06-1028, slip op. at 19 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2007).
The NLRB has yet to decide whether, on its own, the display of a rat balloon or a
giant banner violates § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), having twice dodged the issue. See Sheet Metal
Workers NLRB, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3, at *7 n.3 (finding it unnecessary to rule on the
legality of the rat balloon because it found an unfair labor practice on the grounds of
the Sheet Metal Workers’ mock funeral); Laborers’ E. Region Organizing Fund, 346
N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 167, at *13-14 (opting not to review the
administrative law judge’s decision that the rat balloon, on its own, was sufficient to
constitute illegal secondary picketing after concluding that the union engaged in
illegal picketing because union members patrolled in front of and blocked the
entrance to the secondary employer’s premises).
Nine bannering cases are all pending before the NLRB. Telephone Interview with
Richard Hardick, NLRB Division of Operations Management, NLRB (Sept. 27,
2006). So far, six of the nine administrative law judge decisions resisted declaring
bannering illegal, based on their concerns that such a finding would violate the First
Amendment. Richie’s Installations, 2005 WL 2071662; Held Props. II, 2005 WL 831458;
Grayhawk Dev., 2005 WL 195115; Sunstone Hotel Investors, 2005 WL 77044; New Star
Gen. Contractors, 2004 WL 2671638; Carignan Constr. Co., 2004 WL 359075. Similarly,
four district court judges and one federal circuit court judge found that bannering is
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A new framework for interpreting § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is therefore
necessary to clarify the provision’s meaning and to bring its ban on
29
secondary boycotts back within the bounds of the First Amendment.
This Comment proposes that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) be interpreted as
banning union secondary protests only when (1) they inflict or
a legal and constitutionally protected activity. Overstreet ex rel. NLRB v. United Bhd.
of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. Local 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2005),
aff’g, No. 03-0773 J (JFS), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19854, at *16-17 (S.D. Cal. May 7,
2003); Gold ex rel. NLRB v. Mid-Atl. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 407 F. Supp. 2d
719, 729 (D. Md. 2005); Benson ex rel. NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
of Am. Locals 184 & 1498, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1281 (D. Utah 2004); Kohn ex rel.
NLRB v. Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1175 (C.D. Cal.
2003). The reason these district court judges faced this issue was that, in four of the
bannering cases described in note 26, the General Counsel petitioned the local
federal district court for an injunction prohibiting the union from engaging in the
secondary bannering pending the administrative law judge’s decision. See, e.g., Kohn,
289 F. Supp. 2d at 1161 (invoking authority to seek injunctive relief under 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(l) (2000)).
Despite the NLRB’s initial avoidance of the rat balloon question and most judges’
reluctance to declare bannering illegal, the NLRB seems poised to forbid both
secondary protest tactics. See Sheet Metal Workers NLRB, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3, at *6
(being careful to note that, although the Sheet Metal Workers’ mock funeral
constituted picketing because union members patrolled in front of the hospital and
thus formed a barrier to entrance, such a barrier is not an essential element of
picketing). But see Ryan & Davis, supra note 23, at 147-54 (forecasting that the NLRB
and courts will likely reject the government’s efforts to prohibit unions’ secondary
use of rat balloons and banners on First Amendment grounds).
28. See infra Part II.B (asserting that, under certain circumstances, mock funerals,
rat balloons, and banners all constitute communicative conduct that is protected by
the First Amendment).
29. See Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful
Secondary Picket Under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 1560-61 (2006) (arguing that the current interpretation of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) abridges unions’ free speech rights and suggesting a new
interpretation that the provision bans only those union protests that block access to a
secondary employer’s business through physical force or intimidation); Manuela
Albuquerque Scott, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket
Under the First Amendment?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 179-80 (1975) (proposing that
courts distinguish between union secondary protests directed at workers, which
would be presumed coercive and thus illegal, and union secondary employers
directed at the public, which would be presumed non-coercive and legal).
The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in the Sheet Metal Workers’ mock funeral case
also supports the need for a new test. Sheet Metal Works D.C. Circuit, No. 06-1028, slip
op. at 19 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2007). In that decision, the court found that a mock
funeral does not constitute picketing and is therefore protected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 15-16, 17. As such, it could only be banned if it were truly
coercive. Id. The court noted the lack of a clear standard for gauging the
coerciveness of a union secondary protest. Id. at 17. But rather than articulate a
definition of coercion, the D.C. Circuit merely compared the mock funeral to the
conduct in the Supreme Court abortion protest cases. See id. at 17-19 (noting that in
those cases the Court also had to grapple with whether the protestors’ conduct was
coercive). Such an approach solves the constitutional problems of the picketing test,
but it still fails to give unions a clear test they can use to decide whether a secondary
protest tactic will be deemed illegal. Rather, it requires unions to continue to guess
whether a judge will analogize their behavior to a different kind of protest conduct.
To solve this shortcoming, this Comment proposes an actual definition of coercion
to be used by the courts and the NLRB in secondary protest cases. See infra Part III.
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threaten to inflict an injury on secondary employers, their customers,
or their employees that those individuals have a right to avoid, and
(2) the injury threatened or inflicted is so substantial that no
30
reasonable person would feel free to ignore the union’s demands.
Part I describes in more detail how the current “picketing test” arose
from efforts by Congress, courts, and the NLRB to clarify
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s ambiguous text and to avoid an unconstitutional
meaning. Part II demonstrates that the picketing test has failed to
solve either of these problems, for the test is neither clear nor
constitutional. Part III articulates a new test for when union
secondary protests are coercive. Building off of definitions of
coercion used in other areas of the law, Part III asserts that a
“coercive” union protest is one that would overcome the will of any
reasonable person by threatening that person with substantial harm
31
that he or she has a legal right to avoid.
Part IV applies this
proposed test to the mock funeral, rat balloon, and bannering cases.
The Comment concludes that courts should adopt this new test, for it
does a better job of clarifying the meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and
ensuring that the provision exempts all constitutionally protected
speech.
I. THE PICKETING TEST: AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY SECTION
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) AND EXEMPT ALL CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED
SPEECH
The “picketing test” approach to interpreting the NLRA’s
secondary boycott ban arose from efforts by Congress, courts, and the
NLRB to give clear and constitutional meaning to the provision’s
32
terms. The secondary boycott ban was added to the NLRA by the
30. See infra Part III (deriving the test from legal definitions of coercion found in
other sections of the NLRA and other areas of law).
31. Infra Part III. Please note that this proposed test only determines whether
secondary protest speech rises to the level that it may be prohibited under the NLRA.
This test does not consider the time, place, and manner restrictions that the
government may impose on such speech. Compare Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.,
512 U.S. 753, 773-74 (1994) (holding that a state court violated the First Amendment
rights of abortion protestors by declaring that they could not physically approach any
person within 300 feet of an abortion clinic unless that person expressed a desire to
communicate), with Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730 (2000) (approving a
restriction that stated that, when within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic,
protestors could only come within eight feet of their intended target, for such a
buffer zone still allowed the protestors to communicate their point of view).
32. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (explaining how, in trying to
define “threaten, coerce, or restrain,” courts tend to give examples of coercive union
behavior rather than define the term and compare subsequently challenged protests
to those previously-cited examples of coercive conduct); infra notes 48-82 and
accompanying text (observing that both congressional and judicial efforts to prove
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33

Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. The goal of the provision was to prevent
unions from forcing neutral third parties to get involved in labor
34
The legislation was a
controversies not of their own making.
response to unions’ tremendous success at the beginning of the
twentieth century in crippling the businesses of many neutral
35
employers through secondary-employee strikes. As a result, in its
original form, the ban prohibited unions from inducing strikes
36
among secondary employers’ workers.
After a decade, Congress decided that the language of the statute
contained so many loopholes that unions were still successfully
forcing secondary employers to get involved in primary labor
37
disputes.
For example, the ban technically allowed a union to
induce a strike among a secondary’s employees if it appealed to
workers one at a time, and it failed to prohibit coercive activity
targeted directly at the management and supervisory personnel of
38
secondary employers.
Therefore, the 1959 Landrum-Griffin
39
Amendments expanded the scope of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prohibit
that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not violate the First Amendment have stressed the lack of
constitutional value of picketing).
33. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (2000)).
34. See 93 CONG. REC. 4310, 4323 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft), reprinted in II
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at
1106 (1985) (declaring that the statute prohibited behavior that would hurt the
businesses of third parties “wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an
employer and his employees”); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am. v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (finding that the purpose of the provision is to
“restrict the area of industrial conflict”); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (observing that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was adopted to
serve “the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations
to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of
shielding unoffending employers and others from pressure in controversies not their
own”).
35. See, e.g., Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 29, at 1531-32 (describing how one
union cost a secondary employer eighty-five percent of its business by inducing a
strike among its employees); see also Kheel, supra note 10, § 36.01[2][a] (observing
that, prior to the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, secondary boycotts were “an
effective weapon in labor’s arsenal”).
36. See Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(A), 1947, Pub. L. No. 101, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (2000) (making it an
unfair labor practice for unions “to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in[] a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment . . . to perform any services, where an object thereof is . . . forcing or
requiring [the secondary employer] to . . . cease doing business with any other
person”).
37. Bock, supra note 15, at 913-14.
38. Id.
39. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86257, §§ 701-707, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160
(2000)), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 23-28 (1985).
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any secondary union protest that would “threaten, coerce, or
restrain” any person, with the object of forcing a secondary employer
40
to stop doing business with a primary employer. This remains the
41
language of the statute today.
Unfortunately, as courts have noted, this language is “nonspecific”
42
and “vague.” It is not readily apparent when a union protest will
“threaten, coerce, or restrain” a secondary employer or its customers
43
or employees. Instead of explicitly defining these terms, however,
courts and the NLRB have preferred to examine the unique facts
surrounding each protest to decide whether it violated the secondary
44
boycott ban.
Because this approach leaves judges without clear
standards for determining whether a union secondary protest is
coercive, judges tend to look at which protest tactics courts have
declared illegal in earlier cases and compare those tactics to the
45
protest in the case before them.
Because Congress enacted the
secondary boycott ban largely with secondary picketing and strikes in

40. Id. § 704(a).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000). The section now reads, in its entirety:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is . . .
(B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any
other person . . . .
Id.
42. NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274,
290 (1960).
43. See id. (holding that the NLRB’s interpretation of § 8(b)(1)(A) was broader
than Congress intended). There is also much confusion about how one determines
whether the union intended to force the secondary employer to stop doing business
with the primary employer. Lesnick, supra note 15, at 1366-1430. This Comment
does not address the proper standard of intent in secondary boycott cases; rather, its
main focus is what type of conduct the government may constitutionally prohibit.
44. See Bock, supra note 15, at 934 (observing that courts and the NLRB have
been “circumspect” in giving definite meaning to § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)); see also
Bricklayers Local 1 (Yates Restoration Group), Case No. 2-CC-2594-1 (NLRB Advice
Memorandum Jan. 12, 2004), http://www.nlrb.gov/research/memos/advice_memos
/index.aspx (select “2004” and click “Go” button; click “HTML” hyperlink under
“Bricklayers Local 1”) (asserting that the Board looks at the “totality of the
circumstances” surrounding a union secondary protest to decide if it is illegal).
45. See, e.g., Kentov ex rel. NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418
F.3d 1259, 1264 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005) (listing, as examples of coercion, “strike[s],
picketing, or other economic retaliation and pressure in the background of a labor
dispute” (citing Carpenters Ky. State Dist. Council, 308 N.L.R.B. 1129, 1130 n.2
(1992))).
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46

mind, judges see picketing as the archetypal example of a coercive
secondary protest and often justify a finding that a secondary protest
47
In
is illegal by analogizing the challenged protest to picketing.
other words, one reason judges began using the picketing test was to
clarify the ambiguous language of the secondary boycott ban.
The picketing test also arose out of efforts by Congress, courts, and
the NLRB to avoid any meaning of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) that would
48
infringe upon unions’ constitutional rights.
Many judges and
commentators have noted that the provision may be unconstitutional
49
on its face.
The First Amendment declares that “Congress shall
50
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” The Supreme
Court has interpreted this amendment to mean that when speech
occurs on sidewalks and in other “traditional public fora,” the
government may only burden it with reasonable time, place, and
51
manner restrictions, and the government may not entirely prohibit
52
speech because of its content or viewpoint. Since § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
singles out and bans only labor speech, speech that often occurs on
public sidewalks and streets, courts could find that the provision
constitutes viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
53
Amendment.

46. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (explaining that secondary
strikes were the impetus for the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban).
47. See, e.g., Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Held Props. II), No. 31-CC-2126,
2005 WL 831458 (NLRB Apr. 5, 2005) (declaring that a union’s act of holding up a
banner was coercive because this act resembled picketing, which also involves
standing outside an employer’s premises and holding up a sign).
48. See Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations,
and Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149,
166-70 (1990) (noting that, because labor legislation is a particularly sensitive area of
congressional activity, there is a general reluctance to invalidate federal labor laws on
constitutional grounds).
49. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607,
616-18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (worrying that the NLRA places an
unconstitutional “content-based ban on peaceful picketing of secondary employers”);
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 76, 79 (1964)
(Black, J., concurring) (asserting that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violates the First Amendment
because, under the provision, “picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when the
picketers express particular views”); Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing
and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1471, 1483-84 (1982) (illustrating
the content discrimination of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by noting that the provision would
punish union picketing where members held signs condemning a secondary
employer, but would ignore union picketing where members held signs condemning
a primary employer).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
52. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
53. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (declaring that a law
banning threatening hate speech constituted unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-102 (1972) (striking
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To avoid this constitutional problem, one must read the secondary
boycott ban as prohibiting only types of protest that are not protected
54
by the First Amendment. Congress attempted to follow this path in
1959, when it passed the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
55
NLRA.
In addition to amending the language of § 8(b)(4),
Congress added what is now commonly known as the “publicity
56
proviso.” The proviso declares that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) was not meant
to prevent unions from engaging in “publicity, other than picketing,
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public . . . that a product or
products are produced by an employer with whom the labor
organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
57
employer . . . .” Because the proviso irrefutably states that picketing
is not publicity, it reflects Congress’s judgment that picketing may be
prohibited without raising any concerns about unduly burdening
58
union speech.
This proviso has given judges another reason to

down an ordinance which forbids picketing near school buildings unless related to
labor-management disputes).
54. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (observing that
there are several types of speech that are “of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality”).
55. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (explaining how Congress
amended the NLRA to try to solve some of the problems presented by its original
wording).
56. Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 29; see also H.R. REP. NO. 86-1147 (1959)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 942 (1985) (listing, as one of the
compromises made between the two houses of Congress regarding their differences
over the Landrum-Griffin Bill, the addition of the publicity proviso to clarify that
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not prohibit unions from publicizing their labor disputes to the
employees, managers, and customers of secondary employers).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000). The legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments does not clarify exactly what Congress meant when it exempted all
forms of “publicity” from the secondary boycott ban; most of the comments made
during the discussion and debate of the provision echoed the following statement
given by then-Senator John F. Kennedy:
We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in
front of that secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree
that the union shall be free to conduct informational activities short of
picketing. In other words, the union can hand out handbills at the shop, can
place advertisements in the newspapers, can make announcements over the
radio, and can carry on all publicity short of having ambulatory picketing in
front of a secondary site.
105 CONG. REC. 17, 898-99 (1959), reprinted in II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1432 (1985).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000); accord Lee Modjeska, The Tree Fruits Consumer
Picketing Case—A Retrospective Analysis, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1005, 1032 (1984)
(providing a thorough overview of the legislative history of the Landrum-Griffin
Amendments and concluding that the comments universally agree that secondary
picketing is not exempt from § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) by the publicity proviso).
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enforce the secondary boycott ban by analogizing challenged protests
59
to picketing.
The final circumstance that has led to the use of the picketing test
in interpreting § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) has been courts’ own efforts to deal
with the provision’s constitutional problems. The publicity proviso
does not exempt all constitutionally protected speech from
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s scope. The case of Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
60
Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council highlights
this point. In DeBartolo, a union distributed leaflets urging the public
to boycott a shopping mall because one of the mall’s tenants hired a
construction company who, in the union’s opinion, gave its workers
61
substandard wages and fringe benefits.
Such handbilling, the
62
Supreme Court held, is protected by the First Amendment. But
since the publicity proviso only explicitly exempts publicity meant to
alert others to the fact that a secondary employer is distributing goods
that were produced by a primary employer, and not publicity aimed at
advising the public that a secondary employer is utilizing services that
were supplied by a primary employer, the handbilling at issue in
63
DeBartolo was not exempt from the secondary boycott ban.
As a result, those constraints have forced the courts and the NLRB
to either strike down the thirty-year-old provision as unconstitutional
or read § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in such a was as to allow constitutionally
64
protected speech like handbilling. Because courts do not like to
65
strike down statutes on constitutional grounds, they generally reach
59. Bock, supra note 15, at 922-24; see, e.g., Mid-Atl. Reg’l Council of Carpenters,
No. 5-CC-1289, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 80, at *50-51 (Mar. 2, 2006) (ruling that the
publicity proviso does not protect union bannering of secondary employers because
bannering is a form of picketing).
60. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
61. Id. at 570-71.
62. See id. at 575-76, 578 (noting that the leaflets were distributed in a peaceful
fashion, without any picketing-like activity, and presented the public with truthful
information about the wage and benefit practices of the shopping mall’s business
partners).
63. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bld. & Constr. Trades
Council (DeBartolo I), 463 U.S. 147, 155-58 (1983) (holding that the proviso did not
exempt a union protest aimed at publicizing the fact that a shopping mall employed
the labor of a non-union subcontractor, for the subcontractor was not a producer of
goods, as explicitly required to be exempt under the proviso). But see NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 54-56 (1964) (finding that the proviso exempted a union
protest of a grocery store that distributed the goods of a wholesale distributor with
whom the union had a primary dispute; even though the distributor had not actually
manufactured goods sold by the grocery store, the Court felt it could be considered a
“producer” within the meaning of the publicity proviso).
64. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 575-76, 577.
65. See id. at 575 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)) (explaining
that, when a statute seems like it may be unconstitutional, courts should see if there
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one of two conclusions in secondary boycott cases: (1) that the
challenged form of union secondary protest is constitutionally
66
protected, but, conveniently, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not prohibit it;
or (2) that the challenged form of protest is banned by
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), but such a ban poses no constitutional problem
67
because the protest falls outside the protection of the Constitution.
In the DeBartolo case, the Supreme Court followed the first strategy
68
to keep the NLRA within the bounds of the First Amendment. As
explained above, DeBartolo presented the Court with a type of union
secondary handbilling that was constitutionally protected but was not
69
exempt from the secondary boycott ban by the publicity proviso.
The Supreme Court successfully avoided any constitutional problems
by concluding that handbilling is not coercive because it lacks the
characteristics of picketing that have led courts to traditionally find
70
picketing coercive. The Court also looked at the legislative history
behind § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and found no evidence that Congress meant
71
to proscribe peaceful handbilling. Therefore, the Court avoided
any First Amendment problems by finding that the secondary boycott
72
ban does not prohibit handbilling.
In other cases, the Court followed the tactic of finding that the
form of union protest is prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) but that it is

are other ways to legitimately read the statute that would not raise such serious
constitutional problems).
66. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (finding that handbilling was constitutionally
protected but was not “coercive” and thus did not violate § 8(B)(4)(ii)(B)).
67. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding that
the government may ban “fighting words,” or words likely to incite a violent reaction
from a reasonable listener, without raising any First Amendment concerns). But see
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-84 (1992) (asserting that even types of
speech like obscenity, defamation, and fighting words are covered by the First
Amendment and, thus, the government may not discriminate on the basis of content
or viewpoint in regulating them).
68. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 570-71 (describing how the union distributed
leaflets urging the public to boycott a shopping mall because one of the mall’s
tenants hired a construction company who, in the union’s opinion, gave its workers
substandard wages and fringe benefits).
69. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (explaining that the handbills
the union distributed were truthful and peacefully distributed, and thus a form of
First Amendment speech, but were not covered by the publicity proviso because they
did not publicize information about a secondary employer selling a primary
employer’s goods).
70. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 580 (pointing out that picketing is “a mixture of
conduct and communication and the conduct element often provides the most
persuasive deterrent to third persons about to enter a business establishment,”
whereas handbills “depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea” (internal
quotations omitted)).
71. Id. at 580.
72. Id.
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73

not constitutionally protected speech. Initially, courts invoked the
First Amendment doctrine that expression aimed at illegal ends is not
74
constitutionally protected. Because the goal of a union secondary
boycott is, by definition, to induce one party to stop doing business
with another party, courts felt that the protests were aimed at the
“illegal end” of restraint of trade and thus lay outside the First
75
Amendment.
Over time, however, this position became untenable. First, courts
decided that antitrust laws did not apply to the activities of labor
76
unions.
Second, in the civil rights context, the Supreme Court
began to recognize the tremendous importance of consumer boycotts
as a protest tool, and declared that activities aimed at inducing
77
consumer boycotts were entitled to First Amendment protection.
The courts then turned to a different First Amendment doctrine,
the so-called “speech-conduct distinction” (also known as the
“expression-action dichotomy”), to justify the constitutionality of
78
their decisions declaring union secondary protests illegal.
The
speech-conduct distinction asserts that the First Amendment protects
79
only speech, not conduct.
Under this theory, union secondary
73. Schneider, supra note 49, at 1469.
74. Id. at 1481-88; see, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949) (“It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of
conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”).
75. See, e.g., Giboney, 336 U.S. at 497-98 (1949) (finding that, where a union
attempted to put pressure on primary by obtaining agreements from suppliers not to
sell to the primary, the union protests could constitutionally be prohibited because
they were part of an illegal conspiracy to engage in restraint of trade); Carpenters
& Joiners Union Local 213 v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 724, 728 (1942) (ruling that
union picketing of a neutral employer lacked First Amendment protections because
such picketing violated the state’s antitrust laws); Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (holding that a union’s dissemination of messages
urging customers not to patronize non-union businesses constituted illegal restraint
of trade).
76. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233-36 (1941) (holding the
Sherman Antitrust Act inapplicable to unions).
77. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 909-12 (1982)
(upholding right of civil rights activists to organize a consumer boycott against white
merchants). See generally Michael C. Harper, The Consumer’s Emerging Right To Boycott:
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware and its Implications for American Labor Law, 93 YALE L.J.
409 (1984) (arguing that, although there was no foundation in First Amendment
precedent for the right to boycott as articulated in Claiborne Hardware, this right is
consistent with American social and constitutional values and should be extended to
protests outside of the civil rights context).
78. See Schneider, supra note 49, at 1488-95 (summarizing the reasons why the
Supreme Court has found picketing to constitute something more than speech: its
potential for violence, its threat of economic or physical harm to those who cross the
picket line, its powerful emotional impact, and its persuasive force).
79. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 209 (2d ed.
1996). Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17, 26 (1971) (reversing an
appellant’s conviction for entering a courthouse wearing a jacket emblazoned with
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protests lose their First Amendment protection when they persuade
through the force of their conduct rather than the strength of their
80
The Court has held that picketing constitutes such
ideas.
unprotected conduct for two reasons: (1) picketing typically involves
the act of “patrolling” (i.e. walking back and forth in front of a
particular locality) and thereby physically blocks or impedes access to
places of business; and (2) picketing has tremendous symbolic power
in this country and triggers automatic sympathetic responses on the
81
part of observers.
This position that picketing is conduct, not
speech, and is devoid of constitutional protection is the final reason
why judges are often tempted to decide the legality of challenged
82
union secondary protests by analogizing them to picketing.
Therefore, the picketing test is the result of efforts by judges to
clarify the ambiguous meaning of the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban
and to bring this meaning within the mandate of the First
Amendment. The following section discusses why the picketing test
has not succeeded in achieving either of those goals.
II. THE PICKETING TEST FAILS TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION OR SOLVE
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A test that determines the legality of a union secondary protest by
analogizing the protest to picketing fails to clarify the meaning of
83
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and to exempt all constitutionally protected
the words “Fuck the Draft”), with United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-82
(1968) (upholding an appellant’s prosecution for publicly burning his selective
service certificate).
80. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Soc’y Hill Towers Owners’ Ass’n, 335
N.L.R.B. 814, 826 (2001) (finding that it infringes no constitutional rights to forbid a
union from broadcasting protest messages at excessive volumes); Serv. & Maint.
Employees Union Local 399, 136 N.L.R.B. 431, 436-38 (1962) (finding a union
protest illegal because union members physically blocked access to the entrance to a
building).
81. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607,
619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); accord Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,
464-65 (1950) (concluding that picketing is not pure speech for the purposes of the
First Amendment because it involves patrolling and because of its greater power to
trigger certain automatic responses on the part of observers).
82. See infra Part II.B (describing how some judges have declared the staging of
mock funerals, the inflation of giant rat balloons, and the holding of large banners
to violate the secondary boycott ban, and have justified the constitutionality of such
decisions by drawing an analogy between each of these protest activities and
picketing).
83. See Lee Goldman, The First Amendment and Nonpicketing Labor Publicity under
Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1469, 1471
(1983) (warning that the current approach to interpreting the NLRA’s secondary
boycott ban “leaves the state of the law in doubt and provides little guidance to
unions that increasingly contemplate employing this most effective economic
weapon”).
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expression from its scope. Part II.A explains why it is not clear what
types of activities are prohibited by a ban on union secondary
picketing. Part II.B argues that, in both theory and practice, the
picketing test can be used to unconstitutionally burden unions’ free
speech rights.
A. What’s in a Picket?
The picketing test for interpreting § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) fails to give
unions a precise idea of what forms of secondary protest are
85
prohibited.
It is very difficult to predict whether a judge will
86
analogize a given union protest tactic to picketing. In addition,
87
For
there is little agreement over what constitutes picketing.
example, some judges argue that picketing requires patrolling, while
88
others hold that it does not. Similarly, some courts will not find that
union behavior amounts to picketing unless it was confrontational;
89
others completely ignore this factor. Finally, even if a judge does
find that the challenged form of protest constitutes picketing, it is not
clear whether the judge will automatically find the union protest

84. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (acknowledging that a ban
on picketing is constitutional where picketing poses a “clear and present danger of
destruction of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the
peace,” but noting that such dangers are not “inherent in the activities of every
person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a
labor dispute involving the latter”).
85. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (asserting that picketing may be
protected by the First Amendment because picket lines can be forms of expression).
86. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old
Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889, 937-43
(1991) (presenting a series of hypothetical situations that demonstrate how difficult
it is to tell the difference between constitutionally protected handbilling and
unprotected picketing).
87. Bock, supra note 15, at 921.
88. Compare Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (New Star Gen. Contractors), 2004 WL
2671638 (NLRB Nov. 12, 2004) (noting that “[w]hat particularly distinguishes
picketing from other types of expression is [that] . . . [t]ypically, pickets patrol a
facility or location”), with Serv. Employees Union Local 87, 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743
(1993) (arguing “that neither patrolling alone nor patrolling combined with the
carrying of placards are essential elements to a finding of picketing; rather, the
‘important’ or essential feature of picketing is the posting of individuals at entrances
to a place of work” (citations omitted)).
89. Compare NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936, 940 (2d Cir. 1964)
(“One of the necessary conditions of ‘picketing’ is a confrontation in some form
between union members and employees, customers or suppliers who are trying to
enter the employer’s premises.”), with United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 1827 (United
Parcel Serv., Inc.), 2003 WL 21206515 (N.L.R.B. May 9, 2003) (“[C]onfrontation in
the sense of assertive or aggressive behavior is not a necessary element of
picketing.”).
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illegal or simply consider that fact as evidence of illegal secondary
90
activity.
B. A Protest by Any Other Name Would Be Constitutionally Protected
In addition to creating confusion about what types of behavior are
forbidden, the picketing test fails to exempt all constitutionally
91
protected expression from the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban. Just
because a form of protest looks like, or actually is picketing, that does
92
not mean that the First Amendment does not protect it. On the
contrary, unions usually form picket lines to convey a message and
93
thereby engage in a form of expression. As a result, the government
94
may only burden such protests with reasonable restrictions. Because
the picketing test encourages courts to prohibit unions from
engaging in secondary protests that resemble picketing, even when

90. Compare Service Employees Union Local 87, 312 N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993)
(asserting that “it is, of course, clear that picketing . . . restrains or coerces employers
within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)”), with Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund
& Metro. Reg’l Council, 334 N.L.R.B. 507, 508 (2001) (rejecting the concept that “all
picketing at a secondary site, no matter what the circumstances, is inherently
coercive” under § 8(b)(4)(B)).
91. Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 29, at 1543.
92. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940) (stating that a union’s
publicizing of its labor disputes is “within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution”); see also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112-13
(1940) (“The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a
natural and appropriate means of conveying information on matters of public
concern.”). Though the Supreme Court has never overruled Thornhill, it has since
adopted a position that contradicts the sentiment expressed in that case. See NLRB v.
Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (reasoning that picketing forfeits its constitutional
guarantees because “the conduct element rather than the particular idea being
expressed . . . provides the most persuasive” argument in favor of the union’s
position). Nonetheless, for as long as the Supreme Court has attempted to
characterize picketing as unprotected conduct, commentators have exposed the
logical inconsistencies in this position and offered theories for why the Court really
refuses to extend picketing the rights enjoyed by nearly identical forms of political,
religious, and cultural protests. See generally Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial
Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s extension of greater First Amendment protection
to peaceful non-labor picketing and to commercial speech requires a reexamination
of the way the Court treats peaceful labor picketing).
93. See infra Part II.B.1 (contending that union picketing and similar forms of
protest constitute communicative conduct because they are intended to convey a
message of protest against particular employers, a message that is likely to be
understood by most American audiences).
94. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that the Supreme Court has ruled that the
government may only burden communicative conduct with reasonable restrictions
that are necessary to serve an important government interest).
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the government has no legitimate reason to prohibit them, it violates
95
the First Amendment.
1. Union secondary protests as communicative conduct
Most union protests contain an expressive element and are thus
entitled to First Amendment protection. In picketing, for example,
union members hold signs and march back and forth in order to
express an idea: their disapproval of the secondary employer doing
96
business with the primary employer. This is similar to marching in a
97
parade to express pride in one’s group, burning a flag to protest the
98
government, or taping a peace sign to a flag to express distress over
99
the killing of protestors. The Supreme Court has identified such
types of protest as “communicative conduct,” or conduct that is
entitled to First Amendment protection because, even though it is
not pure speech, it is undertaken in order to communicate a
100
message.
It is true that nearly all conduct potentially communicates an
underlying message, and so it would be absurd to view all conduct as
101
constitutionally protected.
Therefore, the test for determining
whether conduct is truly communicative is whether the actor
possessed “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” through

95. See id. (arguing that staging mock funerals, inflating rat balloons, and
displaying giant banners are all communicative conduct entitled to constitutional
protection).
96. See Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 29, at 1528 (referring to picketing as “the
workingman’s means of communication” (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941))).
97. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.,
515 U.S. 557, 561, 568 (1995) (finding an expression of pride in the Irish heritage of
the gay, lesbian, and bisexual members of the group and defining a parade as
“marchers who are making some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to
bystanders along the way”).
98. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (describing how, during a
protest of the 1984 Republican National Convention, an individual burned an
American flag while protestors chanted, “America, the red, white, and blue, we spit
on you”).
99. Cf. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 407-08 (1974) (noting that the
protestor taped his peace sign to the flag to let people know that he thought
“America stood for peace” and was deeply discouraged by the killing of the student
protestors at Kent State University).
100. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568 (holding that parades are a form of expression in
addition to being a form of motion); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416-17 (holding that the
state cannot limit the expressive messages that conduct such as flag burning might
represent); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409, 414-15 (finding that the act of taping a peace sign
to a flag was “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the First . . . Amendment[]”).
101. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (rejecting the
argument “that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea”).

RAKOCZY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

8/6/2007 10:16:52 PM

2007] ON MOCK FUNERALS, BANNERS, AND GIANT RAT BALLOONS 1639
the conduct and whether, given the surrounding circumstances, “the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those
102
By this definition, most union protests, including
who viewed it.”
pickets, are a constitutionally protected form of speech because they
are undertaken for the purpose of conveying a message of
dissatisfaction with an employer, and most Americans will perceive
103
such a message when they view a union protest.
Some have argued that even though picketing fits the Supreme
Court’s definition of communicative conduct, it is by its nature
something more powerful than speech and thus undeserving of First
104
Amendment protection.
Justice Stevens embraced this so-called
“speech-plus” argument when he opined that picketing “calls for an
automatic response to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an
105
idea.”
Similarly, Justice Frankfurter considered picket lines to
possess a mythical power that evokes “loyalties and responses . . .
106
unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word.” Both Justices
Stevens and Frankfurter were therefore confident that bans on union
107
picketing did not violate the First Amendment.
But the speech-plus theory is based on the assumption that labor
picketing is more than speech because Americans tend to respond
108
sympathetically to union protests.
Such a theory punishes union
102. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing how unions use picket
lines to publicize their labor disputes).
104. See, e.g., Jeff Vlasek, Note, Hold Up the Sign and Lie Like a Rug: How Secondary
Boycotts Received Another Lease on Life, 32 J. CORP. L. 179, 193-94 (2006) (warning that
banners declaring “Shame!” on secondary employers might lead consumers to
automatically boycott those businesses because they would assume such signs meant
that the secondary employer was engaged in a labor dispute with a union and would
immediately decide to stop patronizing that store).
105. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607,
619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950) (citation omitted).
107. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring); Hughes, 339 U.S. at 465-66
(citation omitted). See generally Goldman, supra note 83, at 1482-86 (discussing the
evolution of, and justifications for, the speech-plus theory of picketing).
108. See Scott, supra note 29, at 178 (contending that picketing directed at the
general public is not very powerful because almost no unions have enough control
over members of the public to force them to take sympathetic action). But see Bakery
& Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, . . . since
the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”). In the past,
the speech-plus theory was also justified by a belief that picketing was almost always
accompanied by violence. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 294 (1941) (holding that a state may constitutionally enjoin
peaceful picketing if picketing in the region was historically violent and, thus, even
peaceful picketing would cause fear); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A
Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1953) (explaining that courts
during the early twentieth century believed that the possibility of “peaceful
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speech for its effectiveness, a result contrary to the spirit of the First
109
Indeed, Americans have historically shown great
Amendment.
respect for religious values and the sanctity of human life, yet this is
not grounds to view abortion protests by religious groups as
inherently more powerful (and thus subject to less First Amendment
110
protection) than other forms of protest. Nor should it be grounds
to strip labor unions of their constitutional rights.
The only other reason to view picketing and similar labor protests
as constitutionally-unprotected conduct is if the aims of union speech
can negate the constitutional protection to which it would otherwise
be entitled. The Supreme Court advanced such an argument in dicta
111
in the civil rights case of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.
In
Claiborne, the Court found that civil rights protesters had a First
Amendment right to use picketing to publicize a consumer boycott of
112
white merchants who refused to embrace racial integration.
The
Court was quick to limit its holding, however, to pickets aimed at
113
inducing consumer boycotts in non-labor contexts.
In the labor
context, the Court explained, such picketing could promote
“industrial strife;” thus, the government must have the power to
114
regulate and even prohibit union picketing. In other words, speech
aimed at effecting economic change is subject to less protection than
speech aimed at effecting political change because of the
115
government’s important interest in regulating the economy.
picketing” was as unlikely as “chaste vulgarity” (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (S.D. Iowa 1905))).
109. See Bakery & Pastry Drivers, 315 U.S. at 775-77 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(acknowledging the special power of picketing but finding that, so long as it is
peaceful, picketing may not be banned solely because it is effective).
110. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994)
(upholding First Amendment right of protestors to stand outside abortion clinics
carrying posters that were potentially offensive to those seeking the clinic’s services);
Cannon v. City of Denver, 998 F.2d 867, 873-74 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
First Amendment protected abortion protestors marching on the sidewalk outside of
a clinic with signs that read “The Killing Place”).
111. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
112. Id. at 909-12.
113. See id. at 912 (noting the disruptive effect that even peaceful boycotting can
have on local economies).
114. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447
U.S. 607, 618 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
115. See George Carruthers Covington, Note, Constitutional Law—The First
Amendment and Protest Boycotts: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 62 N.C. L. REV.
399 (1984) (reading Claiborne Hardware as stating that the government’s interest in
economic regulation can sometimes outweigh the free speech rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment). See generally Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The
Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4, 4 (1984) (characterizing labor law
as “the one area of law in which the policies of the [F]irst [A]mendment have been
consistently ignored, reduced, and held to be outweighed by other interests”); James
Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L.
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This view of picketing is unsettling for two main reasons. First, it is
difficult to distinguish those pickets aimed solely at political change
116
versus those with purely economic goals; in fact, some protests
117
might combine the two. Even if such a distinction were possible to
draw, the Supreme Court has never fully justified why union speech
pushing for better economic conditions for workers is less worthy of
118
protection than pure political speech.
Perhaps for these reasons,
the Supreme Court has retreated from the economic-versus-political
speech distinction, declaring in DeBartolo that a union does not forfeit
its First Amendment right to hand out leaflets just because the
119
content of the leaflets urges a consumer boycott.
In conclusion, nothing about the inherent form or ends of union
secondary picketing makes it devoid of constitutional protection. As
long as the union initiates the picketing with the purpose of
conveying a message, and that message is likely to be understood,
picketing and similar forms of union secondary protest constitute
communicative conduct. As such, these forms of protest are
guaranteed by the First Amendment.
2. The picketing test’s failure to limit the secondary boycott ban to truly coercive
union protests
The picketing test violates unions’ First Amendment rights because
the test sweeps under its rule not only coercive union protests, but

REV. 1071, 1073, 1074-78 (1987) (arguing that there is a “black hole” in the
Constitution as far as labor speech is concerned, and tracing the origins of this black
hole to the Lochner-era idea that “labor is a commodity and labor liberty consists
solely of an individual’s right to sell her labor commodity”); Schneider, supra note
49, at 1497 (suggesting that the unspoken reason for the Supreme Court’s restrictive
view of labor picketing is that it is unwilling to extend constitutional protection to
speech that damages the economic interests of businesses).
116. See Covington, supra note 115, at 404 (noting that protest boycotts can be
viewed as both political and economic in nature).
117. See, e.g., Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 214-15
(1982) (involving a labor union that protested the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan by refusing to handle cargo shipped from or to the Soviet Union).
118. See Seth Kupferberg, Political Strikes, Labor Law, and Democratic Rights, 71 VA. L.
REV. 685, 697 (1985) (comparing worker strikes for political goals with worker strikes
for economic goals to demonstrate that both are deserving of equal constitutional
protection).
119. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988) (upholding a union’s right to
distribute leaflets while observing that when consumers boycott a store after reading
a leaflet, the loss of customers suffered by the secondary employer “is the result of
mere persuasion, and the [secondary employer] who reacts is doing no more than
what its customers honestly want it to do”); see also Kohler, supra note 48, at 172
(observing that the legality of a union’s appeal to consumers to boycott a secondary
employer depends on the “manner in which the union makes that appeal,” not in its
result).
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also protests that merely seek to persuade secondary employers to stop
doing business with primary employers. Assuming that union
120
secondary protests generally constitute communicative conduct, the
government may only burden such protests with restrictions that are
121
narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate government interest.
The
government interest furthered by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is the protection
of secondary employers from being coerced into other parties’ labor
122
disputes. So, to stay within the bounds of the Constitution, courts
must interpret § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) as prohibiting only those protests that
truly coerce secondary employers into ceasing their business with
123
primary employers.
Because picketing and similar forms of labor protest do not always
force a secondary employer’s hand, a rule banning all secondary
124
picketing is not narrowly tailored. Application of the picketing test
to the mock funeral, rat balloon, and bannering cases illustrates this
point. Staging mock funerals, inflating giant rat balloons, and
125
holding up large banners are all forms of communicative conduct.
As explained above, communicative conduct is conduct that is
undertaken with the intent to convey a particularized message amidst
circumstances that indicate that the message will likely be understood
120. See supra Part II.B.1 (making the case for why most forms of union secondary
protests fit the Supreme Court’s definition of communicative conduct).
121. Cf. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (finding that a protest
combining elements of speech and non-speech can be limited when a “sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech element” exists).
122. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that the goal of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is to limit union-employer disputes to those parties alone and not
involve neutral businesses).
123. Cf. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82 (observing that burning a draft card could
constitutionally be prohibited because such a prohibition was necessary to serve the
substantial government interests of coordinating and maintaining the draft, and
there was no less burdensome way to promote this objective).
124. As one commentator queried:
Cannot the handbiller confront the approaching customer with the same
pair of beady eyes as the picketer? Or is it the sign on the stick that bothered
Justice Stevens [when he noted in a concurring opinion that picketing is
different from other forms of protest, NLRB v. Retail Store Employees
Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)]? Unless we expect the stick to be wielded as a weapon, it would
surely seem improper to forbid the picket sign but not the handbill merely
because the placard may be more visible and thus more likely to catch a busy
shopper’s eye.
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law in Two Transitional Decades, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 495, 501 (2004).
125. See Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 29, at 1560-61 (reasoning that inflatable
rats and large banners fall under the free speech exemptions of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)); see
also Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that a
union could not constitutionally be enjoined from erecting a giant rat balloon on a
public right of way, for inflating a rat balloon in a traditional public forum is
constitutionally protected speech), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 399 (2005) (mem.).
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126

by those who view it. Rat balloons and banners both constitute such
communicative conduct because unions use them to convey a specific
message (displeasure with labor conditions at the protested venue),
and viewers are likely to understand that message because of the
127
plain meaning of the words on the banners and because of the
ubiquity of the rat balloon as a symbol of union-management
128
disputes.
The Sheet Metal Workers’ mock funeral also fits the Supreme
Court’s definition of communicative conduct. The union staged the
performance to make the point that the use of non-union labor hurts
not only workers, but also the people who rely on the services
129
provided by those workers. It attempted to convey this message by
suggesting that patients died at the hospital, possibly due to the
130
negligence of the hospital’s workers.
Even though the funeral
addressed solely the hospital’s treatment of patients rather than its
treatment of workers, the First Amendment does not limit its
protection to speech that is directly within the scope of an individual
131
or organization’s business. Thus, because the Sheet Metal Workers’
street theater was intended to convey a message and the message
seemed to be understood by passersby, the mock funeral constituted
communicative conduct that was entitled to constitutional
132
protection.
126. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text (setting forth the Supreme
Court’s definition of communicative conduct).
127. See, e.g., Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters (Carignan Constr. Co.), 2004 NLRB
LEXIS 74, at *10-11 (Feb. 18, 2004), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/A
LJ% 20Decisions/JD(SF)-14-04.pdf (describing how the union members held up a
banner clearly declaring, “Shame on [name of employer]! Labor Dispute”).
128. See Laborers’ E. Region Org. Fund & The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B.
No. 105, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 167, at *76 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov /shared_files/Board%20Decisions/346/346-105.pdf (noting
that it is common knowledge that a “rat” is an employer who employs non-union
labor).
129. See Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers ALJ), 2004
NLRB LEXIS 688, at *20-21 (Dec. 7, 2004) (explaining that the union felt the
underlying greed of the targeting hospital was negatively affecting both workers and
patients), aff’d, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers NLRB),
346 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ Board%20Decisions/346/346-22.pdf.
130. See id. at *17-21 (describing how some union members acted like members of
a funeral procession, while other union members handed out fliers that described
deaths and injuries sustained by patients at the hands of the hospital’s doctors).
131. See First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978)
(invalidating a Massachusetts policy that prohibited corporations from funding
political advertising on issues that were not likely to “materially affect[]” their
business or property).
132. Cf. supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text (describing how, to protest
the labor practices of a secondary employer, unions use words and symbols that are
universally understood to express labor-management disputes); accord Sheet Metal
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Just because mock funerals, rat balloons, and banners are forms of
communicative conduct protected by the First Amendment, however,
does not mean that the government may not regulate or even ban
such protests; on the contrary, the government may restrict
communicative conduct if such restrictions are narrowly tailored to
serve § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s identified goal of preventing unions from
133
dragging secondary employers into other parties’ labor disputes.
There is, however, no evidence that mock funerals, rat balloons, or
banners are so inherently frightening or disruptive that they force
customers and workers to avoid a secondary employer’s premises or
otherwise impede a secondary employer’s business so that the
134
In fact, unions
employer has to give in to the union’s demands.
only use stunts like inflating rat balloons and staging mock funerals
because they are absurd and will grab the attention of members of
the public who would otherwise be too busy to notice the union’s
135
protest. Because mock funerals, rat balloons, and banners present
no actual or threatened harm that the government would have a
legitimate interest in preventing, the Constitution forbids the
136
government from completely prohibiting their use.
Nevertheless, some judges have analogized the use of mock
funerals, rat balloons, and banners to picketing and have thus
concluded that neither the law nor the Constitution protects these

Workers D.C. Circuit, No. 06-1028, slip op. at 17-19 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2007)
(comparing the mock funeral to the conduct in the Supreme Court’s abortion
protest cases and concluding that the mock funeral was not coercive and thus could
not constitutionally be banned).
133. See supra notes 120-123 and accompanying text (explaining that the
government may only restrict communicative conduct in ways that are reasonably
necessary to achieve some legitimate government purpose, and noting that the
government interest behind the secondary boycott ban is preventing unions from
forcing neutral employers to get involved in primary labor disputes).
134. See supra notes 1-5, 24-26 and accompanying text (describing the nonthreatening use of these protest techniques).
135. See Unions’ Inflatable Rat an Endangered Species: Unions say the prop is protected
under the Constitution, WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT, Sept. 9, 2005, available at
http://www.workforce.com/section/00/article/24/15/94.html (quoting a union
organizer as saying that giant rat balloons are necessary to get the attention of
passersby). But cf. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers ALJ),
2004 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *32 (Dec. 7, 2004) (observing that the union admitted
that patients of the hospital and their families might find a mock funeral outside a
hospital offensive, and thus such a protest risks alienating potential supporters), aff’d,
Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 (Sheet Metal Workers NLRB), 346 N.L.R.B.
No. 22, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_
files/Board%20Decisions/346/346-22.pdf.
136. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (deducing that, if a union
secondary protest tactic constitutes communicative conduct, the government may
only burden such protected speech with limitations designed to prevent it from
forcing observers to acquiesce to the union’s demands).
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forms of union secondary protest. The NLRB found that the mock
funeral constituted illegal picketing because the “funeral”
138
An
participants marched in a loop in front of the hospital.
administrative law judge found that the inflation of a rat balloon
constitutes picketing if the rat has a sign on its chest, for then the rat
139
is acting as a “surrogate” picketer.
Similarly, three of the nine
administrative law judges who have considered the legality of
bannering have concluded that bannering is picketing because, like
picketing, bannering involves several union members standing
140
outside the premises of an employer and holding up a sign. Those
administrative law judges and NLRB members who declared the
mock funeral, rat balloons, and banners illegal saw no constitutional
problem in doing so because, by analogizing these protest tactics to
picketing, they were able to conclude that the tactics amounted to
141
unprotected conduct.
The NLRB’s and administrative law judges’ treatment of unions’
use of mock funerals, rat balloons, and banners in secondary protests
demonstrates how the picketing test sometimes leads to the

137. See supra note 27 (explaining that two administrative law judges have found
rat balloons analogous to picketing, three administrative law judges have reached the
same conclusion about bannering, and the NLRB may be poised to adopt these
positions).
138. See Sheet Metal Workers NLRB), 2006 NLRB LEXIS 3, at *5-6 (describing how
the protesting union members patrolled, and therefore picketed, the public area
near the hospital).
139. See Sheet Metal Workers ALJ, 2004 NLRB LEXIS 688, at *25; see Laborers’ E.
Region Org. Fund & The Ranches at Mt. Sinai, 346 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 2006 NLRB
LEXIS 167, at *4-8, *13-14 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_f
iles/Board %20Decisions/346/346-105.pdf (observing that the administrative judge
in the initial case below held rat balloons to be synonymous with picket lines because
of their power as a symbol of labor strife, but dodging the question of whether rat
balloons, on their own, constitute picketing because the rat balloon in this case was
joined by patrolling union members and thus violated § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
140. See Mid-Atl. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 2006 NLRB LEXIS 80, at *40-42
(Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ALJ%20Decisions/JD16-06.pdf (emphasizing the many NLRB decisions that have held that union protest
need not involve patrolling to constitute picketing); Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters
(Held Props. I), 2004 NLRB LEXIS 159, at *30-31 (Apr. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ALJ%20Decisions/JD(SF)-24-04.pdf
(finding
bannering to be picketing because it involved placing union members at the
approach to a business’ entrance, to accomplish the goal of keeping customers away
from the business); Local Union No. 1827, United Bhd. of Carpenters (United Parcel
Serv., Inc.), 2003 NLRB LEXIS 256, at *91 (May 9, 2003), available at
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/ALJ%20Decisions/JD(SF)-30-03.pdf
(observing
that bannering has “significant features akin to picketing: a visual message
comprehensible at a glance and notice of a labor dispute”).
141. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2003 NLRB LEXIS 256, at *97-101 (justifying
a ban on secondary bannering by citing precedent holding that secondary picketing
could be banned without interfering with unions’ constitutional rights).
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suppression of union protests that are not coercive.
Thus, the
picketing test does not satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that
restrictions on communicative conduct be narrowly tailored to the
143
government interest they were meant to serve.
The First
Amendment therefore requires that courts and the NLRB abandon
the picketing test in favor of a new test that bans only those forms of
144
union secondary protest that are truly coercive.
Part III proposes
such a test.
III. THE COERCION TEST
Courts and the NLRB should adopt a new rule that outlaws
secondary union protests only when they inflict or threaten to inflict
upon the secondary employer (or its employees or customers) a harm
that (1) they have the right to avoid, and (2) is so substantial that no
reasonable person would feel free to ignore the union’s demands.
This proposed test is derived from the definition ascribed to
“coercion” in other areas of the law and in other sections of the
145
NLRA.
As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[w]here Congress
borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and
meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the
cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body
146
of learning from which it was taken.”
Most legal definitions of coercion contain two elements: a force
147
First, in order to
element and a violation of legal rights element.
142. See supra notes 124-136 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of
mock funerals, rat balloons, and banners, and arguing that such forms of protest do
not force anyone to give in to the unions’ demands).
143. Cf. supra notes 124-125 and accompanying text (explaining that the
government violates the First Amendment when it seeks to prohibit communicative
conduct, that is, conduct by which a party communicates a message in such a way
that it is likely to be understood).
144. See supra note 29 (describing alternate tests proposed in other scholarly
articles).
145. See infra notes 147-159 and accompanying text (reviewing the way coercion is
defined in other legal contexts).
146. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952).
147. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 19-169 (1987) (analyzing use of the term
“coercion” in the following areas of the law: contracts; torts; marriages, adoptions,
and wills; criminal coercion and blackmail statutes; confessions and searches; plea
bargaining; and criminal defense). Synthesizing the definitions of coercion from
these multiple areas of law, Wertheimer concluded that there is a “two-pronged”
theory of legal coercion. Id. at 172-73. See generally Robert Nozick, Coercion, in RIGHTS
AND THEIR FOUNDATIONS 242-74 (Jules L. Coleman ed., Garland Publishing 1994)
(defining the essential elements of coercion as (1) P threatens to commit some act if
Q does A (and P and Q both understand these words to be a threat); (2) the threat
makes Q substantially less able to do A than she was before; (3) P and Q both believe
that if Q does A and P carries out her threat, Q will be worse off than if Q didn’t do A
and P therefore didn’t carry out the threat; and (4) Q does not do A, and the reason
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commit coercion, Person A must force Person B to take some action,
or to refrain from taking some action, by acting or threatening to act
in such a way that would overcome the will of any reasonable
148
person.
Second, Person B must have a legal right to avoid that
149
harmful action or threat.
The second element is often overlooked in colloquial use of the
150
word “coercion,” but it is crucial to the legal definition of the term.
The law invokes the concept of coercion when it needs to decide who
151
bears responsibility for an individual’s actions. Because a finding of
coercion absolves the doer of a deed of legal responsibility for the
deed, the deed must have been necessary for the doer to avoid some
is P’s threat); MICHAEL R. RHODES, COERCION: A NONEVALUATIVE APPROACH 118-23
(Robert Ginsberg et al. eds., Rodopi 2000) (identifying the elements of a coercion
claim as (1) an assertion that Q was actually threatened or reasonably believed she
was threatened with harm, loss, or injury, and (2) Q acted in such a way as to avoid
this threat, and Q’s avoidance behavior was reasonable, given the actual or perceived
threat).
148. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 147, at 172 (stating that the first prong of the test
for legal coercion is whether A makes a proposal that “creates a choice situation for B
such that B has no reasonable alternative but to do X”); see also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 212.5 (2006) (defining coercion as threats made with the purpose of unlawfully
restricting “another’s freedom of action to his detriment”); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09 (2006) (creating the affirmative defense of duress where a defendant was
coerced into criminal action “by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against
his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist”).
149. Edwin C. Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 999 (1978); see WERTHEIMER, supra note 147, at 172 (explaining that the second
prong of the coercion test is that it must be wrong for A to inflict or threaten to
inflict the harm on B: “It is ordinarily not coercion if A proposes to do what he has
an independent legal right to do, so long as the right is not abused or used for
purposes that the law considered illegitimate”). Similarly, fifteen states have criminal
coercion statutes (Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Washington). WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
§ 18.3(e), at 50 n.173 (2d ed. 2003). All of these statutes list the specific types of
conduct or threats that courts should consider “coercive;” if a criminal defendant
forced another person to do something by acting or threatening to act in a way not
listed in the statute, then the defendant did not commit legal coercion. Id. at 51; see,
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5 (stating that a defendant only committed criminal
coercion if, in an effort to restrict another person’s freedom, the defendant
threatened to “(a) commit any criminal offense; or (b) accuse anyone of a criminal
offense; or (c) expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt
or ridicule, or to impair his credit or business repute; or (d) take or withhold action
as an official, or cause an official to take or withhold action”). Most of the fifteen
state criminal coercion statutes echo the Model Penal Code, although some expand
the list of coercive conduct and threats to include: inflicting injury to another’s
person, health, property, business, credit, or reputation; staging or bringing about a
strike or boycott; or testifying against another person in a legal matter. WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra, at § 18.3(e) n.179.
150. WERTHEIMER, supra note 147, at 172.
151. See id. at 172-75 (explaining that the legal theory of coercion is a moral
theory in that it seeks to assign responsibility and not to simply determine the
objective truth of whether A forced B to act against B’s will).
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harm that he or she had a legal right to avoid.
For instance,
suppose two women rob a bank, one because her husband
threatened to kill her if she did not, and the other because her
153
husband threatened to leave her if she did not.
In this
hypothetical, both women were forced to rob the bank, but only the
former was legally coerced, because only she was threatened with a
154
harm that she had a legal right to avoid.
This definition of coercion is also consistent with the way the word
“coercion” has been interpreted when used in other parts of the
155
NLRA. For example, § 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from coercing
156
This provision is
employees into refraining from organizing.
interpreted as banning only that activity which presents workers with
157
a “threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” In other words,

152. This is why, when the drafters of the Model Penal Code separated the crime
of coercion from the crime of extortion, they limited the definition of coercion to
instances where defendants overcome the will of another by threatening to commit
certain types of criminal or tortious behavior. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 149,
§ 18.3(e) n.175 and accompanying text (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5,
Comment at 266 (1980)) (observing that while any method of obtaining property
that is not rightfully yours counts as extortion, because obtaining property that is not
rightfully yours is always wrong, the way an alleged coercer prompts another person
to act against his or her will is central to determining whether coercion occurred,
given that not all ways of getting people to act against their will are morally
culpable).
In addition to being fairer, the First Amendment may require that coercers are only
assigned legal penalties when their coercive actions are also unlawful. See State v.
Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589-90 (1982) (striking down Oregon’s coercion law as
overly broad because it allowed individuals to be convicted of coercion for causing
others to fear the disclosure of discreditable assertions about them, and thus allowed
individuals to be criminally convicted for constitutionally protected expression). For
an overview of the constitutional (expression) implications of the criminal coercion
laws, see Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV.
1081 (1984).
153. See Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 1469, 1473-74 (1983) (providing a similar example involving threats made to a
tavern owner and reaching similar conclusions).
154. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (2006) (declaring that the defense of
duress will not be available to defendants who recklessly place themselves in a
coercive situation or to female defendants who act on the commands of their
husbands).
155. See generally 3 THEODORE KHEEL, LABOR LAW § 10.05(5)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis
2002) (1964) (stressing that employers can be found to have “coerced” employees by
acting in any way that, given the totality of the circumstances, “economically
dependent” workers would feel that they had no choice but to do what their
employer was asking them to do).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
157. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969). See generally Alan
Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356 (1995) (providing a critical analysis of the interpretive
framework that courts and the NLRB use to interpret 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)); Shawn J.
Larsen-Bright, Note, Free Speech and the NLRB’s Laboratory Conditions Doctrine, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 204 (2002) (reviewing the doctrine used by the NLRB for interpreting

RAKOCZY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

8/6/2007 10:16:52 PM

2007] ON MOCK FUNERALS, BANNERS, AND GIANT RAT BALLOONS 1649
employers only act coercively if they act in such a way that indicates
that, if employees do not comply with the employers’ demands, the
employees will either suffer some injury or forfeit some benefit to
158
their employment status or working conditions. A central premise
of § 8 of the NLRA is that workers have a right to be free from having
159
Therefore, the § 8(a)(1) definition of
to make such choices.
coercion focuses on preventing workers from being threatened with a
harm that they have a legal right to avoid.
In sum, the key elements of legal coercion are: (1) the making of a
demand that (2) forces another person to choose between (a)
agreeing to that demand or (b) sustaining some injury or loss that
the person has a legitimate right to avoid, such that (3) the person
160
has no reasonable choice but to give in to the demand.
Thus, a
union secondary protest is only coercive when, (1) with the intent of
forcing a secondary employer to stop doing business with a primary
employer, a union (2) causes or threatens to cause some person
harm that (3) the individual has a legal right to avoid, and (4) is so
substantial that no reasonable person would be able to ignore the
union’s demands. The next section will discuss the advantages of this
test.
IV. THE COERCION TEST BETTER CLARIFIES THE MEANING OF SECTION
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) AND PROTECTS UNIONS’ FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
The two prongs of the coercion test will give unions a better idea
than the picketing test of what types of protests are prohibited and
will also do a better job limiting the ban to truly coercive protest
tactics. The coercion test would find that a union violates §
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only when the union inflicts or threatens to inflict a
harm that (1) is so substantial that no reasonable person would be
able to resist the union’s demands, and (2) the allegedly coerced
individual has a right to avoid.

§ 8(a)(1) and arguing that this doctrine places unconstitutional restrictions on
employer speech during labor organizing campaigns).
158. KHEEL, supra note 155, § 10.05(5)(b). Section 8(b)(1)(A), which forbids
unions from coercing employees into exercising their organizing rights, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1), is considered to be the analogue to § 8(a)(1) is in interpreted similarly.
Id. § 12.07[2].
159. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) (noting that one reason Congress enacted the
NLRA was because it recognized the inequality of bargaining power between
employees and employers and felt that workers needed legal protection of their right
to organize).
160. See supra notes 147-154 and accompanying text (explaining the use of the
term “coercion” in law, the essential elements of the term, and its purpose and
effect).

RAKOCZY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC

1650

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8/6/2007 10:16:52 PM

[Vol. 56:6

The coercion test more clearly articulates what makes a union
secondary protest illegal. The first prong of the coercion test shifts
the inquiry of whether a union protest is coercive to the perspective
of a reasonable person. Thus, to determine whether a given protest
tactic is illegal under the coercion test, unions simply need to ask
whether a reasonable person would find it so harmful or intimidating
that they would have no choice but to give in to the union’s
161
demands.
Though reasonable minds sometimes differ, this is a
much easier inquiry than the question of whether a judge will find
162
that a particular protest tactic constitutes picketing.
The second
prong also provides greater clarity by tying the definition of coercion
to the question of whether the alleged victim had a right to avoid the
harm with which the individual was threatened. The second prong
provides that unions can only be found to have staged an illegal
secondary protest if they acted illegally or in such a way that would
163
give the secondary employer a legal right of action. In other words,
unions can consult the well-defined bodies of criminal and tort law in
their jurisdiction to get a good idea of the legality of their proposed
secondary protest tactics.
Both prongs of the coercion test also ensure that § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
164
As explained
prohibits only constitutionally-unprotected conduct.
in Part I, the Supreme Court’s justification for the constitutionality of
the secondary boycott ban is that it bans only those forms of protest
where “the conduct element rather than the particular idea being
expressed . . . provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons
165
about to enter a [secondary] business establishment.”
But the
picketing test fails to limit the secondary boycott ban to such forms of
166
protest. Rather, as demonstrated in Part II, the picketing test allows
unions to be punished in some situations where the idea being
161. See supra Part III (describing the legal definition of coercion, the coercion
test, and the application of the coercion test to employers and unions).
162. Cf. supra Part II.A (describing the lack of consensus about the precise
elements that constitute picketing and what effect should be given to a finding that a
given union secondary protest amounts to picketing).
163. See supra Part III (discussing how most criminal coercion laws find coercion
only if the alleged coercer has acted or threatened to act in an independently
unlawful manner).
164. See infra notes 165-175 and accompanying text (criticizing how the picketing
test bans constitutionally protected expression and stating how the coercion test
focuses on truly illegal conduct).
165. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607,
619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. See supra Part II.B (describing how union secondary boycotts are
communicative conduct undertaken to convey a particular message that is likely to
be understood and should thus be given constitutional protection, and how the
picketing test is overbroad and not narrowly tailored).
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expressed is the most persuasive element of the protest.
For
example, because some judges believe that the mere congregation of
union members in front of a place of business constitutes picketing,
the picketing test would find a § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation where a
handful of union members silently held up a sign that said, “Labor
168
Few
Dispute—Shame on [Name of Secondary Employer]!”
reasonable people would feel too intimidated to enter a place of
business just because four or five people were standing outside
holding a banner, absent evidence that the union members were
acting or speaking in an intimidating manner. Thus, if bannering is a
persuasive protest tactic, it must be because of the expression on the
169
banner, and not the conduct of the people holding it.
In other
words, the picketing test sanctions the prohibition of some
170
constitutionally protected communicative conduct.
In contrast, because the first prong of the coercion test focuses on
overcoming the will of the protest’s target, it would prohibit only
those forms of protest where the conduct element is truly more
171
persuasive than the communicative element.
Application of the
coercion test to the mock funeral, rat balloon, and bannering cases
will demonstrate this point. On their own, it is doubtful that the
presence of a handful of union members holding up a sign, a handful
of workers marching around in a faux funeral procession, or a giant
rat balloon with a cigar in its mouth would force a reasonable person
to refrain from entering a secondary employer’s place of business, for
none of these forms of protest pose any harm or threat of harm to
172
potential customers.
Nor do they cause or threaten to cause the
167. See id. (critiquing the logic behind the picketing test and demonstrating how
the picketing test fails to exempt mock funerals, rat balloons, and banners from the
secondary boycott ban, despite the fact that these forms of protest are not inherently
devoid of First Amendment protections).
168. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (describing the reasoning
employed in the three administrative law judge decisions that found bannering to
violate the secondary boycott ban).
169. Cf. supra note 165 and accompanying text (justifying the constitutionality of
the secondary boycott ban by alleging that it only bans non-communicative conduct,
that is, conduct that seeks to induce action through intimidation rather than
reasoned persuasion).
170. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text (concluding that the forms of
protest banned by the picketing test that should receive First Amendment
protection).
171. See supra Part III (crafting the coercion test to forbid secondary protests one
where the union’s behavior poses such a substantial harm or threat of harm that no
reasonable person would feel free to ignore it).
172. See supra notes 1-5, 24-26 and accompanying text (explaining that the union
members participating in and accompanying the mock funeral, rat balloons, and
bannering did not engage in any violent or confrontational conduct, and that the
protest tactics themselves were also peaceful and non-intimidating).
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secondary employer harm, for they do not directly interfere with the
173
One could imagine a situation
secondary employer’s business.
where the union employers holding the banner, marching in the
funeral, or standing around the rat balloon physically blocked the
secondary employer’s entrance, or shouted in such an intimidating
tone of voice or with such threatening words that reasonable
174
potential customers would turn back in fear.
But absent those
circumstances, the coercion test would find that mock funerals, rat
balloons, and banners do not constitute illegal secondary boycotts
because they fail the first prong of the test—they would not overcome
175
the will of the reasonable observer.
The second prong of the coercion test—the requirement that the
allegedly coerced individual has a legitimate right to avoid the harm
threatened by the union—also makes the coercion test better
equipped than the picketing test to solve the constitutional concerns
raised by § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). One of the most difficult questions posed
by the secondary boycott ban is whether the act of inducing a
secondary consumer boycott is sufficient, on its own, to violate the
176
provision. Under the picketing test, the answer to this question is:
177
only if the consumer boycott was brought about by picketing. That
answer is unsatisfying for both unions and secondary employers. On
the one hand, it is possible to imagine unions inducing a consumer
boycott through the peaceful dissemination of truthful information
but being punished because the information was contained on a
picket sign. On the other hand, one could imagine incredibly
intimidating protests that might not constitute picketing but would
scare away customers and cause serious damage to the secondary
173. Id.
174. Cf., e.g., Serv. & Maint. Employees Union Local 399 and William J. Burns Int’l
Detective Agency, 136 N.L.R.B. 431, 432-33 (1962) (describing how union members
physically blocked access to the entrance to a secondary employer’s place of
business).
175. Accord Sheet Metal Workers D.C. Circuit, No. 06-1028, slip op. at 18 (D.C. Cir.
June 19, 2007) (holding that although the NLRB “would have us believe . . . the
mock funeral ‘forced’ patrons to ‘cross a death march’ in order to get to the
Hospital, as if the horrors of Bataan in 1942 were being reenacted in front of the
Hospital,” the protest tactic was not the type of protest “by which a person of
ordinary fortitude would be intimidated”); cf. Part III (declaring that the coercion
test bans only those protest activities that would overcome the will of a reasonable
person by subjecting that person to a substantial harm or injury that the person has a
right to avoid).
176. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (describing how secondary
union protests used to be automatically illegal when they induced a consumer
boycott and explaining why this policy proved unworkable).
177. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (explaining that courts were
concerned that picketing was persuasive because of its actions, not its
communication).
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employer’s business. In other words, the picketing test has the
potential to be overinclusive and underinclusive. The coercion test
provides a better solution to this problem; it would find that the
inducement of a secondary consumer boycott violates
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) only where the employer has a legitimate right to be
178
free from that type of consumer boycott. Thus, where a consumer
boycott is induced by coercion or the dissemination of false
information, the protest is illegal because secondary employers have a
179
right to be free from such harm.
But, where unions induce a
boycott through the peaceful distribution of truthful information, no
illegitimate harm has been inflicted and no illegal action has been
180
taken.
This is a more just result for both unions and secondary
employers because it outlaws only secondary boycotts that the
employer has a right to avoid and the unions have no right to
181
initiate. It is also more consistent with First Amendment, since the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that speech aimed at inducing
182
consumer boycotts may be constitutionally protected.
Some may criticize the coercion test for undercutting the purpose
of the secondary boycott ban: protecting neutral employers from
183
being dragged into other parties’ labor disputes.
After all, an
employer who has a giant rat balloon standing vigil outside its place
of business for months on end certainly will not feel like it is being
treated as a “neutral.” But such is the price of living in a democratic
184
society. While Congress has the right to protect neutral employers
from being coerced into other parties’ labor disputes, it does not have

178. See supra note 149 (defining the second prong of the coercion test).
179. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (arguing that individuals only have
a legitimate right to be free from harms caused by criminal, tortious, or otherwise
illegal conduct).
180. Id.
181. Cf. supra Part III (arguing that it is only fair to find coercion when Person A
overcomes the will of Person B by threatening a harm that Person B has a right to
avoid).
182. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (summarizing the holding in
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
183. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress enacted
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prevent the spread of industrial strife outside of the unionprimary employer context).
184. Cf., e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (“As a general matter, we
have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, and
even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate breathing space to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
But see Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717-19 (2000) (balancing abortion protestors’
First Amendment rights against the interest of observers in being left alone, but
limiting this holding to situations where local governments do not prohibit protests
but merely restrict how close protestors can get to their targeted audience).
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the right to take away unions’ freedom of speech in the process.
Because the coercion test interpretation of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) is
necessary to bring the scope of that provision within the mandates of
186
the First Amendment, neutral employers will have to live with any
incidental inconveniences that it sanctions.
CONCLUSION
Staging a mock funeral outside a hospital may be distasteful.
Sticking an employer’s name on a giant rat balloon may be childish.
But, the First Amendment allows Americans to be distasteful and
187
childish in expressing their views.
They just cannot use force or
other intimidating conduct and still claim First Amendment
188
protection.
Courts and the NLRB should thus interpret §
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the NLRA as banning solely those union secondary
protests that inflict or threaten to inflict a harm that (a) the
secondary employer has a legal right to avoid, and (b) is so
substantial that no reasonable person would be able to ignore the
union’s demands. Such a rule will serve the government’s interest in
protecting neutral employers from being forced into labor disputes
not of their own making, while at the same time protecting unions’
First Amendment rights and providing them with a clear test for
when their protest actions will lose constitutional protection.

185. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (stating that there must be an
important governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free speech
to justify limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
186. See supra Parts II.B, IV (highlighting the ways in which the picketing test fails
to exempt all constitutionally protected speech from the scope of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
and demonstrating why the coercion test would solve these problems).
187. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (pointing out that “one
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”).
188. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2002) (noting that the First
Amendment does not protect “true threats”).

